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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
            
  
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
 Roderick Edwards appeals the district court's order 
denying his petition for habeas corpus relief.  Edwards contends 
that the Bureau of Prisons improperly denied him sentence credit 
for the time he spent in home confinement on bond pending appeal.  
The district court denied his petition.  The sole issue on appeal 
is whether his home confinement rises to the penal valence of 
"official detention" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), 
thus entitling him to credit against his sentence.  We conclude 
that it does not and will affirm.  
 I.  
 Edwards pleaded guilty to distribution and possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine base.  The court then placed 
Edwards on pre-trial home detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3142(c) to ensure his appearance at trial and to protect the 
public.  For a period of nine to ten months, Edwards was confined 
to his uncle's home under electronic monitoring and could not 
leave without permission of Pretrial Services.  He was granted a 
number of "black out periods" to leave his uncle's apartment and 
attend church, church choir practice, attorney and court 
appointments.    
 Edwards was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment, 
followed by five years supervised release.  At sentencing, 
Edwards requested sentence credit for the nine to ten months he 
spent in home confinement, which the district court denied.   
 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed 
and held that sentencing courts have the authority to determine 
  
whether a form of confinement amounts to "official detention" and 
whether sentence credit should be granted under § 3585(b).  
United States v. Edwards, 960 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1992).  Shortly 
thereafter, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Wilson, 112 
S.Ct 1351 (1992), held that § 3585(b) does not authorize a 
district court to award credit at sentencing and that the 
Attorney General, through the Bureau of Prisons, is to make the 
sentence credit determination for a defendant.  Id. at 1354-1355. 
 In light of Wilson, Edwards filed a petition with the 
Bureau of Prisons, again raising the issue.  The Bureau denied 
Edwards' petition for "prior custody credit."  Having exhausted 
his administrative remedies, Edwards, now incarcerated at a 
federal corrections facility in Loretto, Pennsylvania, filed a 
petition for habeas corpus relief, raising the same denial of 
sentence credit issue. 
 The district court referred the case to a magistrate 
judge, who recommended that the district court find the 
restrictions on Edwards' freedom were not equal to official 
detention.  The district court rejected Edwards' objections, and 
adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, except 
a portion of the report recommending that "residential 
confinement ... never [be considered] legally onerous enough to 
constitute official detention."  Specifically, the district 
court's order stated that Edwards had "not been restrained to so 
significant a degree that it would constitute 'official 
detention' under the statute." 
  
 Edwards again argues that the time he spent in home 
confinement constitutes "official detention" as that term is used 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which provides in pertinent part: 
  Credit for prior custody - A 
defendant shall be given credit 
  toward the service of a term of 
imprisonment for any time he has 
spent in official detention prior 
to the date the sentence commences 
(1) as a result of the offense for 
which the sentence was imposed. . . 
  
The government does not dispute Edwards concerning the conditions 
of his home detention, but argues that the decision of the Bureau 
of Prisons, which found that Edwards' court-ordered, pre-trial 
residential segregation did not amount to "official detention," 
was reasonable under the statute and entitled to substantial 
deference.   
 Ordinarily, agency decisions are subject to limited 
review and can be overturned only if they are arbitrary, 
capricious or an abuse of discretion, especially when Congress 
has given the agency the authority to carry out a statute's 
purpose.  National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. 
United States, 887 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
495 U.S. 918 (1990).  Moreover, an agency's interpretation of a 
statute that it is responsible for administering is entitled to 
substantial deference.  Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984).  
Here, as the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Wilson,  112 
S.Ct. 1351 (1992), the Attorney General, through the Bureau of 
  
Prisons, has long been trusted with the authority to calculate 
sentence credit for time previously served.  Id. at 1355.  
Nevertheless, because the Bureau of Prisons' assessment of 
Edwards' home confinement was based on its "Program Statements1", 
mere internal guidelines rather than its published regulations, 
its interpretation is entitled to a minimal degree of deference.  
See Koray v. Sizer, 21 F.3d 558, 562 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing FLRA 
v. United States Dep't of Navy, 966 F.2d 747, 762 & n. 14 (3d 
Cir. 1992)(in banc)).   
 In Koray v. Sizer, 21 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 1994), we held 
that the time a detainee spends in a halfway house pursuant to 
court order may be "official detention" if the restrictions on a 
detainee's liberty were equivalent to "jail-type" confinement.  
Edwards asserts that his home confinement was so restrictive that 
it approached jail-type confinement, and that the Bureau of 
Prisons abused its discretion in finding that his confinement was 
not "official detention" under § 3585(b).      
 Edwards simply cannot carry his burden: the terms of 
his home confinement were just not sufficiently onerous to 
                     
1
.  Before the Supreme Court decided Wilson, the Bureau of 
Prisons issued a policy statement on February 21, 1992 that made 
reference to sentence credit.  The Bureau of Prisons Sentence 
Computation Manual CCCA Program Statement 5880.28 (February 21, 
1992) provides that, "[a] condition of bail or bond which is 
'highly restrictive', and that includes 'house arrest', 
'electronic monitoring' or 'home confinement' . . . is not 
considered as time in official detention."  
 However, "[t]he Bureau's interpretation is recorded in 
its 'Program Statements', which are merely internal agency 
guidelines and may be altered by the Bureau at will."  Koray, 21 
F.3d at 562 (citing Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 
1121.02.1.2.1. (April 12, 1993)).  
  
approach jail-type incarceration, and, therefore, did not 
constitute official detention within the meaning of § 3585.  
Edwards minimizes the frequent "blackout" periods he was given 
where he was allowed to leave his uncle's apartment to attend 
church and social events.  Although he was on electronically 
monitored release and could not leave his uncle's apartment 
without permission from Pretrial Services, Edwards was frequently 
allowed to leave the apartment.  There is no evidence that there 
were any restrictions placed on the number of guests he could 
have at his uncle's home.  There is no evidence that limitations 
were put on the frequency of his guests' visits.  Finally, 
Edwards argues that he was not allowed to work while he was in 
home confinement, but no evidence was presented that Edwards had 
a job or had to refuse employment because of the confinement.  
 During the first five months of home confinement, 
Edwards was given permission to attend twenty-two social 
functions, and one personal outing.  Further, from November 22, 
1990 to April 11, 1991, Edwards was given permanent blackout 
periods every Monday, Wednesday and Friday from 5:00 p.m. to 
10:00 p.m. for choir rehearsal, every Saturday from 11:00 a.m. to 
4:00 p.m. for choir meetings, and every Sunday from 9:00 a.m. to 
7:00 p.m. for church service and evening service.  Moreover, 
during the last four months of his release, Edwards was permitted 
approximately thirty hours per week outside of his home 
confinement for church activities.  Finally, his weekend blackout 
periods were extended on three occasions.     
  
 Edwards may argue and indeed prove that his home 
confinement deterred him and taught him a lesson, contained him 
and protected society, and even totally rehabilitated him.  That, 
however, is beside the point.  By Congress' scheme, it simply 
does not matter that the condition of Edwards' home confinement 
may have accomplished all this.  The penologically uncertain, but 
nonetheless patent objective of offense-based sentencing under 
the Sentencing Reform Act is retributive and punitive.    
Congress has determined that the sinner must suffer.  Edwards was 
placed on court-ordered, pretrial detention to ensure his 
appearance at trial, and the fairly modest nature of the 
restrictions placed on him reflects that purpose.  His home 
confinement was not sufficiently jail-like to punish and he gets 
no credit. 
  II.  
 Edwards next argues that the Bureau of Prisons should 
have given him sentence credit because similarly situated 
sentenced persons confined under the same conditions receive 
sentence credit.  This is not true.  Edwards, convicted of 
distributing cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), 
could not even be sentenced to home detention.  Section 5C1.1(f) 
explicitly states that if a defendant's "guideline range is more 
than ten months, the guidelines require that the minimum term be 
satisfied by a sentence of imprisonment."  U.S.S.G. § 5C1.1(f) 
(1990).   
 Edwards' guideline range for violating § 841(a) is well 
above ten months.  He pleaded guilty to distributing fifty grams 
  
or more of cocaine base, which carries a base level offense of 
sixteen under the Sentencing Guidelines.  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 
(1990).  At a minimum, this would result in a twenty-one month 
sentence, and here when his criminal history and other charges 
were taken into account, Edwards received a 120-month sentence.  
Edwards bears no similarity to others sentenced to home 
confinement, because he simply could not have been given such a 
sentence. 
 III. 
 In sum, we will affirm the district court's denial of 
Edwards' petition for habeas relief.  The district court gave 
appropriate deference to the Bureau's conclusion, made the 
unassailable factual determination that Edwards' home confinement 
with electronic monitoring was not sufficiently restrictive to 
meet the Koray test, and properly concluded that his home 
confinement was not "official detention" under § 3585(b).  We 
will affirm. 
